



New Haven, CT  06520-8269
CENTER  DISCUSSION  PAPER  NO.  838









Note: Center Discussion Papers are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate discussions and
critical comments.
This paper is part of a larger project on the fertility transition in Ireland.  Oliver Linton is
part of the larger project and provided useful econometric guidance here.
This paper can be downloaded without charge from the Social Science Research Network
electronic library at: http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=291204
An index to papers in the Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper Series is located at:
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~egcenter/research.htmFertility in South Dublin a Century Ago: A First Look
Timothy W. Guinnane
Department of Economics, Yale University, P.O. Box 208269,
New Haven, CT 06520-8269, timothy.guinnane@yale.edu
Carolyn Moehling
Department of Economics, Yale University, P.O. Box 208269,
New Haven, CT 06520-8269, carolyn.moehling@yale.edu
and
Cormac Ó Gráda
Department of Economics, University College, Dublin,
Dublin 4, Ireland, cormac.ograda@ucd.ie
ABSTRACT
Ireland’s relatively late and feeble fertility transition remains poorly-understood.  The
leading explanations stress the role of Catholicism and a conservative social ethos.  This paper
reports the first results from a project that uses new samples from the 1911 census of Ireland to
study fertility in Dublin and Belfast.  Our larger project aims to use the extensive literature on the
fertility transition elsewhere in Europe to refine and test leading hypotheses in their Irish context. 
The present paper uses a sample from the Dublin suburb of Pembroke to take a first look at the
questions, data, and methods.  This sample is much larger than those used in previous studies of
Irish fertility, and is the first from an urban area. We find considerable support for the role of
religion, networks, and other factors stressed in the literature on the fertility transition, but the
data also show a role for the social-class effects downplayed in recent discussions. 
Keywords:  Ireland, Fertility, Demography
JEL classifications: J1, N31 On the fertility transition outside Ireland see e.g. Anderson, 1998;  Brown and Guinnane,
2002;  Garrett et al., 2001; Gillis, Tilly, and Levine, 1992; Szreter, 1997; van Poppel, 1985.
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Ireland’s sluggish participation in the European fertility transition is well-known.  In the
late 1950s Irish marital fertility had fallen only to where Italian, Dutch, Portuguese, and Greek
fertility had been in the 1920s, and German and English in the 1910s.  Yet there is evidence of a
decline, though limited, in Irish fertility before the Great War.  The decline was uneven both in
terms of geography and religion.  The demand for family limitation in the early twentieth century
seems to have been disproportionately an upper- and middle-class one (Coale and Treadway,
1985;  David and Sanderson, 1988; Ó Gráda, 1985; 1991; Ó Gráda and Duffy, 1995a, 1995b; 
Guinnane, 1997).
1  But the analysis of this fertility decline and closely-related issues such as infant
mortality has not gone far.
This paper is a study of the determinants of marital fertility in urban Ireland a century or so
ago.  Our focus is on Pembroke, a single suburb, and our aim is to get a first look at Dublin’s
fertility as part of a larger study of Ireland’s fertility transition.  We organize our discussion and
investigation around the four main explanations of the fertility transition current in the literature
today: religion, class, migration, and networks.  Religion  has long bulked large in the analysis of
Irish fertility.  Roman Catholicism, the religion of the majority of the Irish population, tends to be
associated with later and more modest fertility transitions in most European studies.  In Ireland
class and religion were correlated, but by no means perfectly, so the influence of class on the
fertility transition deserves separate treatment.  An examination of Irish fertility in the early
twentieth century must also consider the impact of the tremendous population movements of the
period.  The fertility of migrants may differ from that of both their sending populations and the3
populations into which they assimilate.  Finally, in line with a more recent line of research, we
consider how social networks, captured by the characteristics of the neighborhoods in which
couples lived, influenced fertility choices.
 Part 1 of this paper describes its setting in Pembroke before the Great War.  Part 2
describes the data and some of its possible limitations.  Part 3 presents some cross-tabulations and
Part 4 some econometric results.  Part 5 concludes.
1. THE SETTING
In the early eighteenth century Roman Catholics were in the minority in Dublin.  Their
share rose thereafter, from about half in the mid-eighteenth century to about four-fifths a century
later.  In 1911 83.1 per cent of those living within the official city were Catholics.  This takes no
account, however, of suburban areas which remained separate from the city for mainly fiscal
reasons.  In the Greater Dublin area that included the suburban townships of Pembroke and
Rathmines and Rathgar, the Catholic share was somewhat less (78.2 per cent).  Members of the
Episcopalian Church of Ireland accounted for a further 16.7 per cent of the population of this
greater metropolitan area, Presbyterians 1.9 per cent, Methodists 1.2 per cent, and others (mainly
other non-conformists) 2.1 per cent (Dickson, 1989; British Parliamentary Papers, 1912-3: 6049-
I, vii, 6049-II, vii).  The focus of this study is the suburb of Pembroke.  Pembroke township,
located immediately to the south and south-east of the city, was created by an act of Parliament in
1863 (26 and 27 Victoria Cap 72).  Its creation was one aspect of what Prunty describes as ‘the
withdrawal of the old Protestant ascendancy into virtual self-government’, thereby denying the old
city of ‘the contribution, both financially and morally, which it could be expected the wealthiest4
would make’ (Cullen, 1992; Prunty, 1998: 14-5).  Supporters of a separate Pembroke township
referred to savings in the provision of lighting, water, sewage, and so on for the several villages in
‘a large populous and improving district’, though in fact the township district was not large
(1,600 acres).  The population of Pembroke rose from 20,982 in 1871 to 24,269 in 1891 and
29,294 in 1911 (Vaughan and Fitzpatrick, 1978: 29).  
Although controlled by a property-owning elite, the township was quite heterogeneous
both economically and confessionally.  Pembroke contained leafy streets such as Ailesbury Road
and Shrewsbury Road, now and then among the most exclusive in Dublin, and the opulent
Sandymount district.  The township also included some working-class neighbourhoods,
particularly in and around Ringsend, that were characterized by overcrowding and poverty.  The
wealthier streets contained high proportions of Protestant households and household heads born
outside Dublin.  In the poorer streets, households were almost exclusively Catholic and household
heads were much more likely to be Dublin-born.  Households in the poorer areas were also more
likely to live in tenements or to be lodgers (see Bowen, 1942; Cullen, 1992). 
A century ago Dublin was notorious for its poor housing ( Daly, 1984; O’Brien, 1982;
Aalen, 1992; Prunty, 1998).  In this respect Pembroke fared much better than the city proper,
although it did contain many tenement dwellings and one-room apartments.  Pembroke’s housing
quality in 1911 was closer to its rival township of Rathmines than to Dublin proper (Appendix
Table A1).  Pembroke’s occupational distribution was also closer to Rathmines than to the old
city (Appendix Table A2).  Socially and economically our township was more mixed and more
industrial than Rathmines.  Nearly one third of its labour force were unskilled workers,  including5
several dockers, fishermen, and seamen.   The main industrial plant in Pembroke, the Irish Glass
Bottle Company, employed over three hundred men at the time.
2. THE SAMPLE
The manuscript enumeration forms of the Irish population census of 1911 provide our
database.  The Irish census forms for this year are open to the public, in contrast to their British
counterparts. The 1911 census provides details on age, religion, place of birth, and literacy for all
members of enumerated households.  The census also includes socioeconomic information such as
occupation, proxies for housing quality, street address, and the number of live-in servants and
boarders.  The 1911 census asked a set of questions that make it uniquely valuable for the study
of fertility.  Each currently-married woman was asked how long she had been married, how many
children had been born to the marriage, and how many of those children survived.  From this
information we can construct estimates of age at marriage, fertility, and infant and child mortality.
The database used in this papers consists of every married couple in which the wife was less than
50 years old living in Pembroke township in 1911.  This amounts to 2688 couples in all.
The decennial census in Ireland was the responsibility of the Registrar General.  Ireland’s
police force acted as the enumerators.  The police were accustomed to this kind of duty, as they
were also responsible for collecting agricultural statistics. Their diligence and that of the Registrar
General’s office ensured a reliable end-product that was delivered at speed.  Throughout the
United Kingdom the census of 1911 was held on the night of 2/3 April 1911.  In Ireland a
preliminary report was forwarded to the government on 18 May 1911.2  Mis-reporting must be distinguished from age-heaping, which is a feature of census
enumerations in all backward societies.  The 1911 Irish census was less subject to age-heaping
than its predecessor, perhaps because the pension legislation made some people more conscious
of their true age.  On this see Budd and Guinnane, 1992.
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Irish censuses are in general deemed to be reliable and accurate.  But the 1911 census is
well known to be problematic in one respect.  A glance at its age distributions reveals an
implausibly large increase in the numbers of men and women in their sixties and seventies. 
Comparing cohort survival rates between 1901 and 1911 with those for earlier decades in the
published census highlights the extent of the problem for Ireland as a whole (Table 1).  Note the
modest increases in the survival rates up to 1901 and the massive jump thereafter.   
The Registrar General sought to explain this away as a reflection of ‘the numerous cases of
extreme longevity recorded in the public press from time to time’ (Thompson, 1913: 55).  But this
is wishful thinking;  in reality the increase in apparent survival rates was a by-product of the Old
Age Pensions Act of 1908 (Guinnane, 1993;  Ó Gráda, 2002).  That Act had already given rise to
considerable welfare fraud based on age mis-reporting in Ireland.
2  In the absence of civil
registration before 1864  – and incomplete coverage thereafter  – hard evidence of age,
particularly in more remote and poorer regions was not always available.  Claimants suspected
that census declarations of age might be used in processing pension claims, and this suspicion
affected the 1911 census.  Budd and Guinnane found that the extent of deliberate mis-reporting
was positively correlated with rurality and low income.  It was also a function of age; the young
 and the extremely elderly had little incentive to cheat, but those in their fifties and sixties believed
that they did. 7
The upshot is that careless use of the 1911 data can result in misleading estimates of age at
marriage, marital fertility, and life expectation.  But severe age-misreporting was mainly confined
to rural areas, where true age was more difficult to determine.  For urban areas age-misreporting
was less of a problem.  Pension claimants were fewer and other evidence on age more likely to be
forthcoming.  But Table 1 shows that Dublin and Belfast were not immune to age-misreporting on
a more modest scale.  Table 1 also shows that women were more likely to exaggerate their ages
than were men, a pattern that carries over from rural areas.
Confining our database to women aged less than fifty years in 1911 reduces the age-
misreporting problem, but does not eliminate it, as matched samples from the 1901 and 1911
censuses attest.  In Budd and Guinnane’s sample from four rural areas of Ireland, women reported
in the 41-45 year age-bracket had exaggerated their age by 1.45 years on average; in Ó Gráda’s
sample of rural Ulsterwomen, women in this age bracket had exaggerated their ages by 2.5 years
(Budd and Guinnane, 1992;  Ó Gráda, 1985). Such  mis-reporting would tend to bias estimates of
age-specific fertility based on the 1911 data upwards; a woman who claims to be 45 in 1911, but
who is really 41, will have her births attributed to earlier stages of her life.  The extent of the
problem in Pembroke may be gauged by comparing people’s declared ages in 1901 and 1911.  A
matched 1901-11 sample of the ages of over three hundred men and three hundred women in our
database produced an average age increase of 10.20 years for males over the decade and 9.96
years for females. The data revealed little sign of systematic differences by religion, class, or age: 
in all cross-tabulations the average distortion was merely a few months in either direction.
Labourers and labourers’ wives ‘lost’ a month or six weeks over the decade, Catholics were
marginally less prone to add on age than members of the Church of Ireland, and so on.  These8
comparisons suggest that age-misreporting was not a problem in the urban areas which are the
focus of this study (Budd and Guinnane, 1992; Ó Gráda, 2001).  In sum, age-misreporting is
unlikely to bias the outcome of the exercise that follows.
The high quality of the data on births and on infant and child deaths in these censuses is
now generally taken for granted (Haines, 1985: 888; Watterson, 1988: 292).  One concern with
retrospective data such as these are that couples may forget to report the birth of a child early in
the marriage, especially if the couple has been married a long time and the child has died.  Such
omissions imply that the census data under-estimate both fertility and mortality.  Table 2 below
reproduces summary data on infant and child mortality for Ireland as a whole, for Dublin, for all
Irish cities and, for a comparative perspective, for England and Wales.   The Irish mortality rates
are slightly lower than those for England and Wales, but this is consistent with other suggestions
that mortality in rural Ireland was quite low.  Reported child mortality also increased with the
duration of marriage even at the longest duration categories, indicating that couples were not
more likely to omit children the longer they were married.  Also, the mortality rates for Dublin
and other Irish cities are unusually high, more evidence that large number of births were not
forgotten on census night. In common with previous users of similar sources we feel justified in
proceeding on the basis that under- enumeration does not seriously affect the Irish 1911 census.
Another problem is the likelihood of some selection bias from omitting households from a
particular cohort absent through migration or death.  If, for example, having a large family
lowered the life expectation of women then our dataset will underestimate the true fertility of the
population. Data on the impact of family size on maternal mortality are lacking, but this effect and
the resultant bias are presumably small.  Differential migration poses a related problem.  Suppose3 Since married women in Pembroke rarely reported an occupation in 1911, this category
has been omitted here.  Such an omission would not be warranted for places like Belfast, where
many married women continued to participate in the labor force.
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couples who wanted a small family were more likely to migrate from a rural area to an urban area. 
Under that assumption our estimates will reflect both fertility and migration behavior.  For the
purposes of this paper we will ignore this type of problem and view our estimates as a reduced
form or fine-grained descriptive device.  In later efforts we will attempt to estimate models of the
joint processes of fertility and these other factors.
For the rest the census information used in this study  –  that on the birthplaces of the
couple, ages of co-resident children, number of children born and still alive, duration of marriage,
husband’s occupation
3, the presence of servants and or boarders, literacy, knowledge of the Irish
language, religion, housing conditions both in terms of size and type (tenement, lodgings, private
house), street address and district  –  are reported fully in the census, very occasionally after
correction by the enumerating constable.  
3. RELIGION, CLASS, MIGRATION, AND NEIGHBORHOOD:
We consider the effects on marital fertility of four factors: religion, class, migration and
networks.  Most current discussions of the fertility transition in Europe stress one or more of
these factors in explaining both the timing of onset and the pace of fertility decline in a particular
population. Religion plays a central role in many discussions and is the starting point for most
discussions of Irish fertility.  Ireland has been a largely Catholic country since the Dark Ages.  The
barrier of religion meant that post-reformation settlers from England and Scotland were less likely
to integrate with the indigenous population than earlier groups of immigrants or invaders.  In the10
eighteenth century the marital fertility of the Society of Friends was higher in Ireland than in
Britain, but ‘the Irish Quakers... would appear to be a population as sharply distinguished from
the rest of Irish society as they could have been without living in a separate territory with a self-
sufficient economy’ (Vann and Eversley, 1992: 51).  In her memoir of middle-class Dublin in the
1910s novelist Elizabeth Bowen described Catholics as ‘simply ‘the others’, whose world lay
alongside ours but never touched’ (Bowen, 1942: 44).  Religious (and class) divides meant there
was little intermarriage.  In the Pembroke data, less than three percent of marriages involved a
Catholic and a non-Catholic.
Previous research on other confessionally mixed populations in Europe finds that
Catholics were relatively reluctant participants in the fertility transition.  The decline in their
fertility came later and was more modest than that of their Protestant (or Jewish) countrymen.  In
Pembroke, Catholic couples had more children ever born than non-Catholic couples at all marital
durations (Table 3; compare Table A4).  Childlessness was also less common among Catholics.
The differences between the fertility of Catholics and non-Catholics in the Pembroke
sample may not all be due to differences in religious beliefs or mores.  The socio-economic gap
between Catholics and non-Catholics in this Dublin suburb was very wide.  Catholic couples are
63 per cent of all couples in our database.  But these couples account for 95 per cent of all
couples living in tenements.  Catholic households contained a median of 1.7 people per room,
compared to a non-Catholic median of 0.87.  Catholic men accounted for 89 per cent of the
labourers, 78 per cent of semi-skilled workers, 63 per cent of those in skilled occupations, 43 per
cent of the clerks, and 32 per cent of those in professional occupations. 11
These social-class implications of confession in Ireland suggest that it is very important
not to confuse the impact of religion with that of class.  Social-class differentials in fertility are
another important theme in the historiography of the European fertility transition.  But the
literature has not come to any consensus.  In his analysis of the evidence on the marital fertility in
the 1911 census of England and Wales superintendent of statistics T.H.C. Stevenson asserted 
‘the universality of the decline for all classes and all ages at marriage’ (cited in Soloway, 1990:
10).  Historical demographer Robert Woods supports Stevenson, noting that in Victorian England
all socio-economic groups shared in the reduction. Others, however, have argued for a top-down,
diffusionist view of England’s fertility decline, which implies a widening of inter-class differentials
while the decline was taking place.  Michael Haines, for example, argues that ‘knowledge of
social class or occupational group alone can go a long way to explaining differential fertility and
differential rates of fertility decline’ (Haines, 1992; Woods, 1987).  In Table 4 the occupational
categories are a modification of those devised by Stevenson. Class I represents the elite, class II
white collar workers, class III skilled workers, and classes IV and V semi- and unskilled workers,
respectively. In Pembroke in 1911 the gap between the elite and those at the bottom was large
even for couples married 25-29 years suggesting long-standing class differentials in fertility
decisions. 
Migration and differential fertility by migration status is another important theme in many
studies.  Migration can affect fertility in several ways.  The act of migration itself may interrupt
labor-market and other activities, forcing young people to delay marriage and family. More
intriguing is the possibility, noted above, that migrants may differ from either their sending
population or the population into which they move in ways that are correlated with their family-12
size desires.  Irish cities had large numbers of migrants at the turn of the twentieth century. In
Pembroke township as a whole 38.3 per cent of the population aged twenty years and over were
born outside Dublin.  Another 10.6 per cent had been born outside Ireland, mainly in Great Britain
(see Table A3). Over two-fifths of the men and women in our database had been born outside
Dublin. Cross-tabulations by place of birth (Table 5) indicate that at each duration Irish-born
parents were less likely to be childless and had larger families. This raises the interesting
possibility that the Irish fertility transition, such as it was, was in part the product of immigration.
But was place of birth merely a proxy for religion or class?  We return to this issue in Part 4.
The final factor we consider is the role of networks in fertility choices.  This line of inquiry
is an extension of Susan Watkins’ stress on communication networks or ‘who talks to whom’
(Watkins and Danzi, 1995; Rutenberg and Watkins, 1997). A fundamental question that lies at the
heart of the literature on fertility transitions is how ideas and mores spread through the
population.  Watkins has stressed that the fertility transition may reflect the spread of a new set of
ideas (new, at least, to the relevant population) about technology of contraception or the
desirability of smaller families.  To the extent this is true, the mechanisms by which such ideas are
transmitted are crucial.  In this preliminary analysis, we consider how a couple’s fertility decision
was influenced by the proportion of non-Catholics on their street.  There was tremendous de facto
religious segregation in Pembroke in 1911.  Most Catholics lived on streets which were
disproportionately Catholic.  Catholic couples lived on streets where an average of only 23
percent of residents were not Catholics.  Non-Catholics lived on streets where an average of 55
percent of residents were not Catholics.  If attitudes towards fertility control were shaped by
interactions with one’s neighbors, we may expect couples living on ‘non-Catholic’ streets to have13
lower fertility than those living on ‘Catholic’ streets.  Testing for this type of effect is a tricky
business, but we report a rough estimate in part 4 below.
4. A MULTIVARIATE MODEL
These several hypotheses require a multivariate model to perform an adequate ceteris
paribus test.  For example, we noted that Catholics were on average poorer than Protestants.  If
we really want to know the pure effect of Catholicism, we need to use some econometric
structure that will “hold constant” the effect of social class while estimating the effect of religion. 
Our database is rich, but using it requires contending with some econometric traps. The number of
children ever born to a couple – the information on fertility provided in the census data – is a non-
negative integer or ‘count’ variable. Ordinary least-squares (OLS) models do not respect the
character of such data; OLS models are heteroskedastic and often yield nonsensical predictions
such as -1.45 children ever born. Another problem stems from the likely endogeneity of infant
mortality. The first problem has straightforward solutions; the second, unfortunately, does not.
4.1.  Count data
The most commonly-used alternative to OLS for count models is to assume a parametric
(conditional) distribution for the counts and estimate the model by maximum likelihood (ML). 
We employ a version of that strategy here. For each observation in the count representation the
contribution to the likelihood function is P(CEB=k,|X) where CEB is the number of children born,
k is an integer, X is the vector of covariates. These models are consistent with duration analysis,










counts is a distribution describing the waiting-times between births. The total count of births after
N years is just a different way of representing the same information as would be contained in the
hazard rate for a birth in each interval since her marriage. The key difference is a loss of
information: the hazard rate might have been higher or lower in the first interval than in the
second.  The count models assume, implicitly, that the hazard rate was the same (for a given
duration) across all intervals. Count models are in fact the closest analogue to hazards or event-
history models possible given the census data.
The most commonly-used parametric distribution for count-data models is the Poisson
distribution. The probability that CEB takes on a given value k is given under the Poisson
distribution by:
where F is the Poisson parameter to estimate. In most studies the covariates are introduced and
the parameter ensured positive by the functional form 
ln F = Xß
The likelihood function is maximized with respect to the ßs.
The Poisson distribution, however, has the unfortunate feature that its (conditional) mean
is equal to its (conditional) variance:15
E CEB Var CEB ( ) ( ) = = m
This assumption amounts to a strong restriction on the data. In the hazard representation it
amounts to assuming that hazard rates do not depend on duration; in the count representation, it
amounts to a condition rarely satisfied. The number of children ever-born in Pembroke, like most
other data on family size, suffer from overdispersion: the variance is nearly 9 while the mean is
about 3.4.
  Researchers have taken several approaches to contending with overdispersion. One is to
use an alternative distribution that allows for more flexibility. The negative binomial distribution is
popular in part because the Poisson model is nested within it. For the negative binomial
distribution, the relationship between the mean and variance is a function of a parameter that itself
is estimated:
E(CEB) = µ
Var(CEB) = (1 + a)µ
When a is equal to zero, the negative binomial simply collapses to the Poisson distribution. 
Testing whether a equals zero is, therefore, a straightforward test of the assumption that the data
are distributed according to the Poisson distribution.
Another approach to dealing with overdispersion is to deal with mass points in the sample
distribution.  Overdispersion in most fertility data is due to excess zeros. In the Pembroke sample,
if we ignore couples with zero children the mean number of children born is about 4.2 and the4 There may also be fixed costs to childbearing (Guinnane 1997, in fact, stressed these as
an explanation for Ireland’s late fertility transition).  Fixed costs to childbearing would imply a
relatively small number of women at all of the low parities.  We find, in contrast, large numbers of
women with no children, but very few at the other lower parities.
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variance is 7.7. These figures still violate the assumptions of the Poisson model, but the violation
is less severe. The econometrics literature has developed two, parallel approaches to contending
with excess zeros: the hurdle model and the splitting model.   The two models view the source of
the overdispersion differently. The hurdle model assumes that the excess zeros arise because there
is some fixed cost associated with the activity that is counted.  The splitting regime model
assumes that the data are drawn from two different regimes. In one regime the outcome is always
zero and cannot be otherwise. In the other regime it may or may not be zero. 
We believe that in the context of fertility decisions, the splitting model is more appropriate. 
Due to biological reasons, some couples will not be able to have children and will therefore be in
the ‘always-zero’ regime.
4  We cannot identify on an individual basis which couples are in which
regime, but with some structure we can estimate the probability that a couple is in the always-zero
regime, and thus the probability that a couple is not in the always-zero regime. Once we have the
probability that a couple is not in the always-zero regime we can estimate the probability that they
have k children following a distribution such as the negative binomial. In our model we assume
that there is a process that determines whether a couple must always have zero children, and
another process that determines, for those who are not in the always-zero regime, how many
children.  For the remainder of our discussion we will refer to the two regimes as the ‘always
zero’ regime and the ‘kernel’ regime.  17
It is important to note that even in the kernel regime, some couples will have zero children. 
There are two types of childless couples in this model: those that cannot have children due to
biological reasons and those who choose not to have children.  Identification of the two types of
childless couples arises from functional form assumptions, choice of covariates, or both. It is
important to recall (both as econometrician and as reader) that these models are sensitive to many
specification decisions. We cannot claim, in particular, to know whether any couple was in the
always-zero regime, we can only estimate this probability as a function of observable
characteristics. In the empirical work below, we use two variables to identify couples in the
always-zero regime: an indicator for whether the wife was older than 30 at marriage and the
number of years by which the husband’s age exceeds the wife’s.
The great benefit of this approach is that it allows us greater flexibility; it is implausible
that any simple distribution would fit the observed empirical distribution with all the zeros
included, but by making this zero-inflation modification we are in a position to fit more precisely a
distribution that has fewer zeros. By combining the splitting-regime approach with a negative
binomial distribution we are applying two distinct solutions for the excess-dispersion problem
noted in connection with the Poisson distribution. Our splitting model  focuses on the excess-
zeros problem, while the negative binomial allows for excess dispersion above and beyond the
excess zeros. In our discussion below we report ways of testing for the importance of each. 
The log-likelihood function for the zero-inflated model is built up as follows. Let B be the
probability that a couple is in the always zero regime. This is the part of the model estimated by a
binary dependent variable model such as the probit. Couples who have one or more children
contribute (1-B)*P(K=k) for k>=1. In words, this is the probability that they are not in the always5 Our estimates were performed using Stata’s ZINB model.  In future work we will
experiment with less heavily-parametric forms of the splitting model.
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zero regime times the probability of having k children if they are in the kernel regime. Couples
who have zero children contribute [(1-B)*P(K=0)] + [B]. In words, the first part of this
expression is the probability of not being sterile times the probability of having zero children from
the kernel distribution. The second part, B, is just the chance that the couple is sterile. We build
the likelihood in the usual way by combining observations, and can check that this is a proper
likelihood by noting that the conditional probabilities sum to one for each individual.
5
4.2. Endogeneity
The second consideration we face is endogeneity of regressors. It is likely that several of
our regressors are endogenous, but the one of most concern is the measure of child mortality.
Child mortality is expected to influence fertility decisions in a variety of ways.  Perhaps most
important is the so-called ‘replacement effect’.  If couples have a desired family size, we would
expect them to ‘replace’ a deceased child with another birth.  Testing for the replacement effect,
therefore, is a test of fertility control.  Variations in this effect would also be evidence of
differences in contraceptive intensity.  For example if Catholics had a weaker replacement effect
than Protestants, this is evidence, independent of implied family sizes, of less fertility control
among Catholics.
Estimating the replacement effect, however, requires dealing with the likely endogeneity of
child mortality.  There are several economic as well as biological connections between mortality
and fertility at the household level that imply that infant and child mortality were likely19
endogenous to fertility outcomes.  Cross-tabulating the percentage surviving by number born and
socioeconomic class in the Pembroke sample highlights the disadvantage of the unskilled labourer,
but the difference between skilled/semiskilled and clerical/professional households was rather
small.  Similarly, Catholic mortality was higher than non-Catholic at each parity (Table 6).  Infant
and child mortality in Pembroke was highly concentrated in a small minority of households. 
Twenty-five percent of couples married 15 years or longer had experience no child deaths, and 50
percent had seen 12.5 percent of their children die.  Ten percent of households, though, had lost
half or more of their children.  Most deaths were in households with lots of children; the median
couple married 15 years or longer and who had had 5 or more children had seen 20 percent of
them die.
 The usual solution to an endogenous variable is an instrumental-variables approach. With
the appropriate instruments one can purge the regressor of the component that is endogenous and
in effect replace the actual variable with a variable that is only the exogenous component of the
original regressor. Here that strategy faces two problems. First, we have not yet located adequate
instruments. Finding suitable instruments is always difficult in fertility studies because most
variables that affect mortality can also plausibly affect fertility. We are focusing our search on
environmental variables that would affect that chances of infant and child death but bear no
relationship to fertility. Here, we use information on whether a family lived in a tenement and in
which part of Pembroke it lived in 1911.  Neither of these instruments is ideal.  Neither is
obviously exogenous; couples decide, within their economic constraints, on where to live.  The
main virtue of these instruments for a first look is that they are correlated with mortality.  The
causal link is exposure to disease.  The second problem is econometric. There is an implied20
constraint between our dependent variable (CEB) and the endogenous variable (the number of
children who have died). Any instrumental-variable type approach runs the risk of implying
predicted values for the right-hand side variable that violate the constraint; we could, for example,
have observations where the first-stage regression implies the couple had eight surviving children,
although they only had six births. There are several approaches to dealing with that problem at
work in the econometrics literature, but for now we just report a very simple and clearly
inadequate specification that relies on a tobit  model of the proportion of all children who have
died.  We estimate the tobit as the first stage, then use the predicted value of the dependent
variable (taking into account the censoring at zero) as the regressor in the count-data model.  This
two-step procedure implies that the standard errors in the count model are not correct, but we
have not yet corrected them.
4.3. Results
Tables 7 and 8 report two simple models.  The first uses the actual proportion of children
who have died as a regressor (perdead), while the second uses the predicted value (ystar) from a
linear probability model of the proportion of children who have died.  In each case we report both
the main replacement effect (perdead, ystar) and this effect interacted with a dummy for not
Catholic (o_perd, o_ystar). The excluded variables in the first stage of the model reported in
Table 8 are whether the family lives in a tenement and four dummies for different neighborhoods
in Pembroke. 
The other regressors include wife’s and husband’s ages at marriage (wamar and hamar),
social class dummies (i, the highest, is omitted, so ii - v are relative to professionals), house points6 This is a test of the null hypothesis that the parameters of the ‘always zero’ branch are
jointly zero.
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(points, a measure of real estate wealth), religion dummies for the couple (catholic is omitted, so
cofi is both husband and wife Anglican, presb is both presbyterian, mixed is catholic plus another,
and othernon refers to other non-catholics -- mainly other non-conformists).  dur is duration of
marriage as of 1911. This variable is entered as a third-order polynomial with the squared and the
cubed terms scaled down by 100.  The last regressors pertain to birth places.  The omitted couple
has a husband and wife born in Dublin. We then control for husband or wife born elsewhere in
Ireland (hirl, wirl) and for husband or wife born outside Ireland (hfor, wfor).  The final variables
here (ethos, c_ethos) are the proportion of people on the street who are not Catholic, and that
variable interacted with a dummy for Catholic. All these variables are in the kernel regime, which
is modeled as a negative binomial distribution. The probit equation that predicts whether a couple
is in the always zero regime is modeled simply, with indicators for whether the wife was older
than 30 at marriage (wam30,) and a continuous variable which is the number of years by which the
husband’s age exceeds the wife’s (agedif).
The results in both tables indicate that the simple Poisson model does not fit the data,
although not in the way we had expected.  The results for a show that the Poisson is appropriate
as the kernel distribution.  We estimate the model as a negative binominal, but the a of zero
reported here implies that the negative binomial has collapsed to the nested Poisson. But a Wald
test shows that we need the regime splitting model.
6 That is, we can reject the hypothesis that all
the zeros are part of the kernel (Poisson) distribution.22
The models are nonlinear, so the coefficients reported in Tables 7 and 8 do not have
straightforward interpretations.  We report evaluations below that convey a better sense of the
magnitudes of the estimates. Comparing Tables 7 and 8 shows that the rough effort to deal with
the endogeneity of child mortality leads to a vastly different estimates of the replacement effect.  If
we do not instrument for mortality, we have a modest replacement effect (.338) and no significant
difference in the replacement rates of Catholics and others (o_perd=.06).  The instrumental-
variable estimates in Table 8 suggest something very different: the replacement effect for
Catholics is somewhat smaller (.226) but for non-Catholics the effect is much larger (.226 + 1.07). 
These estimates, if our rough approach is to be believed, imply that Catholics made much less
effort to control their family size.
For the rest of this discussion we focus on Table 8. The rest of the results present some
interesting insights into the influences on Irish fertility 1911.  We find strong evidence of the effect
of religion.  In addition to the differential replacement rates already noted, all of the religion
variables are negative in sign and some are statistically significant.  These effects imply that
Catholics had larger families even when their child mortality experience was identical to others.
There was also a clear, strong social-class gradient in fertility decisions.  The families of
professionals (class i) were smaller than the families of men in classes ii-v. Other representations
of the occupational data might make this even more precise. Housing quality, here represented by
points, is precisely estimated but has a small magnitude.  But it, too points to class differences in
fertility.  We also find birthplace effects.  Interestingly, only the husband’s place of birth seems to
have mattered; the husband being born outside Dublin — whether elsewhere in Ireland or outside
of Ireland — depressed family size.23
The ethos effects here are strong and interesting, although the econometrics need
additional work on this score as well.  Ethos is the proportion of couples on a street who were not
Catholic.  C_ethos is ethos interacted with a dummy for Catholic. Taken at face value, the effects
imply that individuals who lived on a predominantly Protestant street had smaller families. The
Catholic interaction term shows that the effect was smaller for Catholics, but not quite zero. That
is, Catholics who lived on Protestant streets also had smaller families, but the reduction in family
size was smaller for Catholics than for Protestants. A simple interpretation of this would be that
one’s neighbors influenced family size, but more if they were of the same religion.  However, the
outcome may also reflect a degree of selection bias: Catholics who opted to live in more
Protestant neighborhoods may have been more likely to be controllers.  Again, not too much can
be made of this result until we sort out other possibilities, but it is interesting nonetheless.
Non-linear models of this sort are difficult to evaluate from the regression coefficients
alone.  One approach is to compute and plot measures for hypothetical (but realistic) couples,
based on the estimates.  This we do in Charts 1-5.  Chart 1 shows the probability distribution of
the number of children ever-born for a laborer and a professional who are otherwise identical. 
The probability of having zero births in this chart is the sum of the probability of being in the
“always-zero” branch and the probability of having zero births conditional on not being in the
“always-zero” branch.  Chart 1 shows that professionals were more likely to have small families. 
The probability of having four or more children was only 41 per cent for the professional
compared to 51 per cent for the laborer.  We do not report standard errors for these measures at
this point, although standard errors can be calculated.  Some of the differences we discuss in
Charts 1-5 may be statistically significant, but some are surely not. 7 These rates were constructed by calculating the change in the predicted number of
children ever born between successive ages (i.e., 25 and 26, 26 and 27, etc.) and then averaging
over five-year age groups.
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Charts 2-5 report a measure that is more common in the demographic literature, the
implied age-specific (marital) fertility rate.  These rates represent the proportion of women in a
given age group predicted to have a birth in a one-year period.
7  Chart 2 once again illustrates
class differences in fertility.  At every age, the wives of professionals had lower fertility rates than
the wives of laborers.  Chart 3 shows the impact of the husband’s birthplace.  Couples in which
the husband was born outside Dublin (but in Ireland) had lower age-specific fertility rates even
after controlling for the age at marriage, religion, and class.  The effects of husband’s place of
birth were, in fact, larger than the effects of class, as can be seen by comparing Chart 2 to Chart 3.
 Charts 4 and 5 attempt to explore the complicated impact of religion in our models, where
religion has both a “direct” effect and an “interaction” effect through the mortality variable (the
replacement effect).  In Chart 4 we show the direct effect of religion by assuming the couple has
not lost any children to mortality.  Catholics had larger families, although the difference is not as
large as might have been expected.  This is a consistent theme of this paper.  Chart 5 repeats the
exercise by assuming that both couples have lost 20 percent of their children.  Here the Protestant
couples have slightly more births. The direct effect is that shown in Chart 4, but the stronger
replacement effect works in the opposite direction.  Chart 5 shows the impact of the stronger
Protestant replacement effect: Protestants were more likely to “replace” a child who has died,8 The mortality rate (20 percent) assumed in Chart 5 is high; the in the sample only about
25 percent of couples married 15 years or more have lost this many of their children.  (The means
are .19 for Catholics and .14 for Protestants).  The effect illustrated in Chart 5, where a stronger
replacement effect dominates the direct effect, thus applies to only part of the sample.
25
because they were exercising more control over their finally family size.
8  This more subtle role of
religion is a warning to ourselves as we pursue this research.
5. CONCLUSION
Ireland was a late and slow participant in the European fertility transition.  Why this is the
case is not well-understood; despite considerable discussion, our understanding of Irish marital
fertility at the turn of the twentieth century rests on a weak empirical base.  This paper is a first
report on a long-term project intended to remedy that deficiency.  Using the 1911 census for the
Dublin suburb of Pembroke, we have investigated, at a preliminary level, the impacts of religion,
class, migration, and neighbors in the Irish fertility transition.  Our most consistent finding is that
religious differences were considerable but are not the entire story.  Only future research will
show whether these results generalize to other urban Irish populations.
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TABLE 1: COHORT SURVIVAL RATIOS (AGES 65-74 TO 55-64)
Ireland  Dublin City    Belfast
Period Male Female Male Female Male Female
1871/1881 0.518 0.489 0.407 0.428 0.483 0.516
1881/1891 0.538 0.513 0.431 0.45 0.549 0.545
1891/1901 0.591 0.553 0.524 0.538 0.587 0.62
1901/1911 0.851 0.935 0.634 0.787 0.694 0.832
   TABLE 2: MARRIAGE DURATION AND CHILD MORTALITY 
(%  of  children  dead  in  1911)
Duration    Ireland Co. Boroughs     Dublin     E&W
<1       6.9       6.2       6.3        7.2
1       6.1       7.9       7.9        7.8
2       7.9       9.9       9.7        9
3       8.4     11.4      11.3       10.1
4        9.3     13.1      12.2       11
5 to 9     11.2     16.2      16.5       13.8
10 to 14     14     20.3      20.8       17.3
15 to 19     16     22.8      23.9       19.5
20 to 24     17.9     26.5      27.3       21.4
25 to 29     19.6     28.9      29.4       22.7   
Source: derived from 1911 Census, Table 165 and 1911 Census of England and Wales. 30
TABLE 3: CROSS-TABULATIONS BY RELIGION AND MARRIAGE DURATION
Catholic
Duration     N Childless      % Children ever born
     0-2    221    116    52.5       0.55
     3-5    258      38    14.7       1.82
   6-10    404      52    12.9       3
 11-14    279      32    11.5       4.22
 15-19    294      24      8.2       5.48
 20-29    297      26      8.7       6.63
  Total  1754    288    16.4       3.78
            Other Religions
Duration     N Childless      % Children ever born
     0-2    122      74   60.7        0.43
     3-5    127      29   22.8        1.39
   6-10    205       40   19.5        2.17
 11-14    160       22   13.7        2.99
 15-19    153      12     7.8        3.84
 20-29    164      16     9.8        5.15
Total    931    193   20.7        2.7831
TABLE 4.  AVERAGE NUMBER OF CHILDREN BORN BY SOCIAL CLASS IN PEMBROKE:
CONTROLLING FOR DURATION OF MARRIAGE
          DURATION OF MARRIAGE (YEARS)
Class 36989 37138 37177 15-19 20-24 25-29
I 0.74 1.62 2.96 3.03 3.67 3.76
II 0.69 2 2.95 4.14 5.26 6.28
III 1.03 2.57 4.45 4.64 6.17 7.63
IV 0.93 2.8 4.28 5.56 6.39 9.47
V 1.01 2.9 4.23 5.83 6.13 7.64
Religion
Catholic 1.01 2.74 4.22 5.48 6.04 7.63
Ch of Ireland 0.75 1.92 2.85 3.95 4.76 5.71
Source: 1911 Pembroke database 32
TABLE 5:  CROSS-TABULATIONS BY PLACE OF BIRTH AND MARITAL DURATION:
    Irish-born parents
  Duration N Childless    % Children ever born
       0-2 260    142  54.6 0.52
       3-5 297      42  14.1 1.79
      6-10 483      67  13.9 2.84
    11-14 342      36  10.5 4.16
    15-19 368      29    7.9 5.11
    20-24 360      32    8.9 6.24
    Total 2111    348  16.5
     One or both foreign-born
Duration N Childless     % Children ever born
      0-2       83 48   57.8     0.49
      3-5 88      25   28.4     1.31
    6-10 126      25   19.8     2.26
  11-14 97      18   18.6     3
  15-19 79       7     8.9     4.01
  20-24 103     10     9.7     5.62
  Total 576    133   23.133









1 90.7 93.7 93.4 91.9 94.1
2 91 87.4 94.4 90.8 92.5
3 86.8 89.2 88.7 87.9 89.1
4 83.7 84.9 90.3 85.3 88.5
5 81.9 80.4 86.1 81.8 84.2
6 84.1 84.3 82.5 83 85.4
7 74.8 80.6 85.1 78.1 80.6
8 78.6 79.6 81.7 79.6 80.5
9 70.5 76 89.6 76.1 80.3
10+ 65.7 71.3 81.9 69.2 76.734
TABLE 7: ZERO-INFLATED NEGATIVE BINOMIAL MODEL OF CHILDREN EVER-BORN, PEMBROKE, 1911 
Zero-inflated negative binomial regression        Number of obs   =       2433
                                                  Nonzero obs     =       2106
                                                  Zero obs        =        327
Inflation model = probit                          LR chi2(22)     =    1557.82
Log likelihood  = -4886.656                       Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
     ceb |      Coef.   Std. Err.       z     P>|z|       [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
ceb      |
 perdead |   .3381426    .057973      5.833   0.000       .2245176    .4517676
  o_perd |   .0606225   .1110035      0.546   0.585      -.1569404    .2781853
   hamar |  -.0054443   .0023231     -2.344   0.019      -.0099975    -.000891
   wamar |  -.0196377   .0033926     -5.788   0.000       -.026287   -.0129884
     dur |    .228772   .0177296     12.903   0.000       .1940226    .2635213
    dur2 |  -.9475956    .118329     -8.008   0.000      -1.179516   -.7156751
    dur3 |    .013983   .0023644      5.914   0.000       .0093488    .0186172
      ii |   .1257916    .043563      2.888   0.004       .0404098    .2111735
     iii |   .2617006   .0471708      5.548   0.000       .1692475    .3541537
      iv |   .2492219   .0474642      5.251   0.000       .1561937    .3422501
       v |   .2275619   .0474523      4.796   0.000       .1345572    .3205667
  points |   .0075911   .0033775      2.248   0.025       .0009714    .0142108
    cofi |    .008461   .0593215      0.143   0.887       -.107807    .1247289
   presb |   .0516132   .0824481      0.626   0.531      -.1099822    .2132086
   mixed |   .0764293   .0846568      0.903   0.367       -.089495    .2423535
othernon |  -.0018691   .0756661     -0.025   0.980      -.1501719    .1464337
    hfor |  -.0812512   .0402673     -2.018   0.044      -.1601736   -.0023288
    wfor |  -.0059279    .042801     -0.138   0.890      -.0898163    .0779605
    hirl |  -.0603722   .0271151     -2.227   0.026      -.1135169   -.0072275
    wirl |   .0195412   .0264918      0.738   0.461      -.0323818    .0714642
   ethos |  -.4708034   .0930352     -5.060   0.000       -.653149   -.2884578
 c_ethos |   .3473984   .1067649      3.254   0.001        .138143    .5566539
   _cons |    .259687   .1241386      2.092   0.036       .0163798    .5029942
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
inflate  |
   wam30 |   .9593597   .1223827      7.839   0.000        .719494    1.199225
  agedif |   .0390353   .0075869      5.145   0.000       .0241652    .0539055
   _cons |   -1.77085   .0719155    -24.624   0.000      -1.911802   -1.629898
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
/lnalpha |  -14.59475   178.9194     -0.082   0.935      -365.2703    336.0808
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
   alpha |   4.59e-07   .0000821                          2.3e-159    9.1e+145
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Wald test of inflate=0:              chi2(3) =    73.66   Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Note: Infant and child mortality modeled as actual proportion dead.  Sample Restricted
to couples married 2 years or more.35
TABLE 8: ZERO-INFLATED NEGATIVE BINOMIAL MODEL OF CHILDREN EVER-BORN, PEMBROKE, 1911 
Zero-inflated negative binomial regression        Number of obs   =       2402
                                                  Nonzero obs     =       2083
                                                  Zero obs        =        319
Inflation model = probit                          LR chi2(22)     =    1494.12
Log likelihood  = -4855.606                       Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
     ceb |      Coef.   Std. Err.       z     P>|z|       [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
ceb      |
   ystar |   .2263647   .5383845      0.420   0.674      -.8288495    1.281579
 o_ystar |   1.067343   .4156213      2.568   0.010       .2527404    1.881946
   hamar |  -.0043295   .0025055     -1.728   0.084      -.0092401    .0005812
   wamar |  -.0185102   .0035286     -5.246   0.000       -.025426   -.0115944
     dur |   .2287144   .0197352     11.589   0.000       .1900341    .2673948
    dur2 |  -.9598175   .1202751     -7.980   0.000      -1.195552   -.7240826
    dur3 |   .0143288   .0023865      6.004   0.000       .0096513    .0190063
      ii |   .1131499   .0453548      2.495   0.013       .0242561    .2020438
     iii |   .2249835   .0614145      3.663   0.000       .1046134    .3453536
      iv |   .2138717   .0659906      3.241   0.001       .0845325    .3432109
       v |   .1965269   .0650455      3.021   0.003       .0690401    .3240137
  points |   .0066352   .0034148      1.943   0.052      -.0000577     .013328
    cofi |  -.1805489   .0963664     -1.874   0.061      -.3694237    .0083258
   presb |  -.1339576    .115395     -1.161   0.246      -.3601276    .0922125
   mixed |  -.1549021   .1266135     -1.223   0.221        -.40306    .0932559
othernon |  -.1759762   .1034592     -1.701   0.089      -.3787525    .0268001
    hfor |  -.0666994    .040475     -1.648   0.099       -.146029    .0126302
    wfor |  -.0156411   .0438968     -0.356   0.722      -.1016772     .070395
    hirl |  -.0597569   .0288878     -2.069   0.039      -.1163759   -.0031379
    wirl |   .0127027   .0304405      0.417   0.676      -.0469596    .0723651
   ethos |   -.362707   .1104012     -3.285   0.001      -.5790895   -.1463246
 c_ethos |   .2150657   .1258994      1.708   0.088      -.0316927     .461824
   _cons |   .2879457   .1267386      2.272   0.023       .0395426    .5363489
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
inflate  |
   wam30 |   .9161918   .1224562      7.482   0.000        .676182    1.156202
  agedif |   .0385326   .0073973      5.209   0.000       .0240341     .053031
   _cons |  -1.739206   .0687088    -25.313   0.000      -1.873872   -1.604539
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
/lnalpha |  -13.49571   151.3036     -0.089   0.929      -310.0454     283.054
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
   alpha |   1.38e-06   .0002083                          2.2e-135    8.5e+122
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Wald test of inflate=0:              chi2(3) =    70.03   Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
                                                               
Note: Infant and child mortality modeled as predicted proportion dead.  Sample
Restricted to couples married 2 years or more.36
                                                                             
APPENDIX 
MAIN OCCUPATIONS IN OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES I-V:
I army officer, brewer, property owner, valuer, engineer, lawyer, director, accountant, rector,
scientist, medical practitioner, broker, merchant, senior civil servant
II clerk, cashier, bookkeeper, official, dealer, civil servant, commercial traveller, draper, grocer,
journalist, policeman, train inspector
III foreman, smith, building contractor, boilermaker, bootmaker, butcher, bricklayer, carpenter,
compositor, electrician, dairy proprietor, master craftsman, plumber, tailor, watchmaker
IV baker, bottleblower, engine driver, fitter, hairdresser, machinist, motor chauffeur, motorman,
painter, postman, railway signalman, shipwright, stevedore, tram conductor.
V carter, coachman, fireman, fisherman, gardener, labourer, porter, sailor, seaman, van driver,
waiter, watchman37





    % Pembroke   % Rathmines &
Rathgar
     %
I Government 13950   14.8   1789
 (*)  22.7    3596  34.2
II Domestic   2636     2.8      308    3.9       293    2.8
III Commercial 20910   22.2   1955  24.8     2891  27.5
IV Agricultural   2152     2.3      265    3.4        137    1.3
V Industrial 54597   57.9   3564  45.2     3596  34.2
Total 94227 100   7881 100   10513 100
(*) includes 220 soldiers
                TABLE A3:  PLACES OF BIRTH OF PEMBROKE RESIDENTS, 1911
Aged<20 Aged<20 20+ 20+
Males Females Males Females
Dublin  4392  4709 4092 5493
Rest of Ireland     354     535 2416 4786
England and Wales     181     177    560    770
Scotland       33       45    185    143
British colonies       13       14      29      59
Indian Empire       11       13      30      56
Foreign Parts       13       10      66       99
Total  4997  5513 7378 1140638
TABLE A1:  Numbers of Tenements of One Room Classified by Number of Occupants in 1911
Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12+
Inhabited
Houses
Dublin 21133 3604 5310 3893 3074 2267 1488   854    431    146   45    16      5 35477
Pembroke     637   137  146  109   99    60      40     25     17       3     3      0      1   5225
R&R     924   375  243  137     69     40      38     11       9       1      1      0      0   6533
Source: 1911 Census
TABLE A4:  PERCENTAGE  OF  COUPLES  WITH  NO  CHILDREN  BY  DURATION  IN  1946 
   Age at Marriage of  Woman
37000 37158 37010 35-9 40-4 All
Duration Cath Other Cath Other Cath Other Cath Other Cath Other Cath Other
37177 5.1 9.3 9.7 14.8 17.7 27.6 37.1 51.6 72.3 82.1 13.8 20.4
15-19 5.7 8.5 9.8 15.8 17.6 25 34 47 69.6 77.2 13.8 19.9
20-24 5.9 9.5 9.5 12.8 16.5 24.1 32.8 32.3 61 67.2 13.3 17.2
25-29 5.8 8.3 9.1 13.2 15.9 20.7 25.4 37.8 57.7 68.9 12.1 16.2
30-34 6.2 9.9 8.7 11.9 12.6 17.9 22.8 32.9 50 65.2 11.2 15.2
35-39 6.7 9.9 8.4 11.2 11 21.1 18.7 33.6 48.4 45.8  9.6 13.9
40-44 6.3 9.8 7.9 12.4 10.3 13.9 15.3 29.2 38.5 75  8.3 12.1
  45+ 7 9 9 14.7 13.2 16.7 13.7 36.4 25.7 0  8.4 11.8


















0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7                       8+
Number of children
Laborer Professional
Distribution of CEB, Pembroke, 1911
Estimated probabilities
Chart 1
Note: Comparison is occupational class v to class i.  House points index set to means for each occupational group
(3.7 and 11.7).  Assumed age at marriage is 25 for the wife, 30 for the husband, and the couple is assumed to have
been married for 10 years.  The couple has lost twenty percent of its children to mortality and lives on a street that
is 50 percent Catholic.  Both spouses are Catholic and born in Dublin.  In this example zeros from the “always
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Age
Laborers Professionals
Age-Specific Fertility Rates by Class
Chart 2









25 to 29 30 to 34 35 to 39 40 to 44 45 to 49
Age
Dublin Elsewhere in Ireland
Age-Specific Fertility Rates by
Husband's Place of Birth
Chart 3
Note: Characteristics assumed to be as in Chart 1, except that the first husband is born in Ireland, the second








25 to 29 30 to 34 35 to 39 40 to 44 45 to 49
Age
Catholics Protestants
Age-Specific Fertility Rates by
Religion -- Child Mortality = 0
Chart 4
Note: Characteristics assumed to be as in Chart 1, except that the first couple are both Catholic, and the second









25 to 29 30 to 34 35 to 39 40 to 44 45 to 49
Age
Catholics Protestants
Age-Specific Fertility Rates by
Religion -- Child Mortality = 0.2
Chart 5
Note: Characteristics assumed to be as in Chart 1, except that the first couple are both Catholic, and the second
Church of Ireland.  They have lost  20 percent of their children to mortality.